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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Morgan Christopher Alley appeals from his conviction for manufacture and
delivery of synthetic marijuana.

Specifically, he asserts that the particular

chemical composition of one of the active ingredients, called AM-2201, in the
synthetic marijuana he produced and sold was not covered by Schedule I.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Alley for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or
possess with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinols (sometimes called 'THC") or
synthetic equivalents between March 2011 and September 2011, conspiracy to
deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, unlawful possession
of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of
paraphernalia, with an enhancement for repeat violations of the controlled
substance laws. (R., pp. 32-36, 58-59.) Alley moved to dismiss the charges on
the basis that the substance he was accused of making or delivering, called
"spice" or "potpourri," was not a controlled substance under the law existing at
the time of the allegedly criminal acts or, alternatively, that the statute did not
provide sufficient notice that his actions were illegal. (R., pp. 79-176.) The state
opposed the motion. (R., p. 201-59.) The district court denied the motion. (R.,
pp. 297-316.) The district court also denied a motion to reconsider. (R., pp. 33463, 367-77, 379.)
Alley ultimately pied guilty to manufacturing and delivery of a controlled
substance and

possession with

intent to deliver paraphernalia and the
1

enhancement, preserving the "right to review on appeal of [the District] Court's
Decision denying his MOTION TO DISMISS and the [District] Court's denial of
his MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of such decision."

(R., pp. 446-51.)

The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 10 years with two years fixed.
(R., p. 482-84.) Alley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 487-89.)
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ISSUES
Alley's statement of the issues on appeal is found on pages 8 and 9 of his
brief and is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Alley failed to show error in the district court's determination that AM2201 was a controlled substance under Schedule I of the Idaho Uniform
Controlled Substances Act as it existed at the time?

2.

Has Alley failed to show error in the district court's determination that the
relevant portion of Schedule I is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
him?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Alley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That AM2201 Was A Controlled Substance Under Schedule I Of The Idaho Uniform
Controlled Substances Act As It Existed At The Time

A.

Introduction
The synthetic marijuana Alley was manufacturing and selling contained

three different forms of synthetic THC (depending on the sample): AM-2201,
JWM-019, and JWM-210. (R., p. 298.) Although Alley did not contest the latter
two ingredients being controlled substances, he did contend AM-2201 was not. 1
(R., p. 298.)

Specifically, he argued that because the statutory definition of

synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol referenced "substitution at the nitrogen atom of
the indole ring by alkyl," and because AM-2201 has a substitution at the nitrogen
atom of the indole ring by an "alkyl halide" (because of the presence of a fluorine
atom), AM-2201 did not fall within schedule I. (R., pp. 299-305. See also R., p.
307 (recognizing that Alley's argument rises from the chemical difference of "a
fluoride atom rather than a hydrogen atom at the end of the carbon chain
attached to the nitrogen atom on the indole").)
The district court began its analysis "with the literal words of the statute"
(R., p. 300) and concluded the defendant's argument trying to distinguish AM2201 from the example of synthetic THC in the statute "misses the point"

1

Because Alley was properly charged with (and is guilty of) manufacturing and
delivering synthetic marijuana containing JWM-019 and JWM-210, which he
admits are controlled substances within the scope of Schedule I, his motion to
dismiss could have been denied on this basis alone. His challenge on appeal to
whether AM-2201 is also within Schedule I is thus moot. State v. Barclay, 149
Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010).

4

because it is derived from "reading a select portion [of the statute] rather than
reading it as a whole" (R., p. 305). 2 The statute in question, Schedule I of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, includes five subsections dealing with
different types of substances, including "[h]allucinogenic substances." (R., pp.
305-06.)

One

subset

of

controlled

hallucinogenic

"[t]etrahyrdocannibinols or synthetic equivalents

substances

was

. . . with similar chemical

structure" to tetrahydrocannabinols "such as ... the following synthetic drugs."
(R., pp. 306.)

Thus, whether the defense was correct, and "AM-2201 is not

derived 'by substitution ... by alkyl,"' was not significant because by using the
phrase "such as" "the legislature intended to include [AM-2201] and substances
like it in Schedule I."

(R., p. 307.)

Such a reading of the statute was also

supported by its legislative history, including the legislative statement of purpose.
(R., p. 307.) The district court concluded:
The Court finds that the Idaho legislature unambiguously
intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and it
The
did so in broad language that encompasses AM-2201.
contrary conclusion is reached only by ignoring the portion of the
statute which indicates the specific formulations are given by way of
example. It was the intent of the legislature to not deal with the socalled 'spice' problem by constantly amending the statute as new
analogs for THC are developed or discovered in the scientific
literature by purveyors of mind altering substances.
(R., p. 308.)
Alley first argues the district court erred by "resorting to legislative history
first, and then using that legislative history to conclude that the unambiguous

2

A copy of the district court's written opinion (R., pp. 297-316) is attached to this
brief as an appendix.
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language of the statute prohibited AM-2201."

(Appellant's brief, p. 10.) This

argument fails because a plain reading of the district court's opinion shows it
relied upon the plain language of the statute to make its decision and only cited
legislative history as consistent with its conclusion about the plain language.
Alley next argues that the chemical composition of AM-2201 and the
chemical formulations specified in the statute are sufficiently different to bring
AM-2201 outside the scope of Schedule I.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-18.)

Specifically, he claims he presented evidence that AM-2201 is in a different
chemical "class" than those listed in the statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.)
This argument overstates the evidence he presented and fails to show error in
the district court's analysis of that evidence. He also claims that by listing as
potential substitutions at the nitrogen atom only chemical chains made up of
carbon and hydrogen atoms the legislature meant to exclude carbon chains with
other atoms, such as fluorine atoms. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) This reading
of the statute is unsupported by its plain language.
Application of the correct legal standard, as was done by the district court,
shows that the plain language of the statute included synthetic THC such as AM2201 within Schedule I.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Plain Language Of The Statute
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute,

which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven,_
Idaho _ , _

P.3d _ , 2012 WL 2053762 at *5 (2012) (internal quotes,

brackets and citation omitted).

If the plain language of the statute is

unambiguous, "legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the
legislature." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,
893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011).

In this case the statutory language plainly

expresses legislative intent to ban all synthetic THC.
The statute in question, l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011) 3 , included in
Schedule I, as hallucinogenic controlled substances, tetrahydrocannabinols or
synthetic equivalents and "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers
with similar chemical structure such as ... [a]ny compound structurally derived
from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution
at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl .... " l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a)
(2011). In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 meets all the terms of this
statute

("synthetic

substance,"

"similar

chemical

structure"

to

tetrahydrocannabinol, "derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-(1naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring") except

3

The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2012 amendment is currently in
effect. l.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2012).
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whether the substitution is by "alkyl." (R., pp. 300-08.) Alley's contention is that
there is no "substitution . . . by alkyl" because the "substitution at the nitrogen
atom of the indole ring" is by alkyl halide, which is different from the alkyl group
because it has a fluorine atom.

(R., pp. 300-08.) The district court properly

concluded that Schedule I included all synthetic THC, and therefore the chemical
distinction claimed by Alley, which was not claimed to render AM-2201
something other than a synthetic THC, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I.
As determined by the district court, the language of the statute that
"synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure" to THC "such as" the
formulations found in subsection ii, plainly states that the formulations are
representative and not exclusive. (R., pp. 300-08.) Thus, the difference of one
atom (fluorine instead of hydrogen) between AM-2201 and the chemical
formulation given as representative of synthetic THC did not render AM-2201
outside the scope of the statute making illegal synthetic substances with similar
chemical structure to THC part of Schedule 1. 4
Alley first argues the district court reached its decision "by resorting to
legislative history." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) This argument is apparently based
on the assumption that "plain language" analysis and determination of legislative
intent are mutually exclusive.

(Id.)

Besides being illogical, the argument that

4

The state on appeal, as in the trial court, contends that AM-2201 is in fact within
the representative formulation provided in l.C. § 37-2705( d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011 ).
(See, ~. R., p. 303.) However, because the district court did not resolve the
issue on this basis, but instead correctly held that the chemical formulations in
the statute are merely representative and the real question is whether the
synthetic has "similar chemical structure" to THC, this issue is not before this
Court for resolution.
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legislative intent is not gleaned from the language used in a statute is without
basis in law. Leavitt, 2012 WL 2053762 at *5 ("When interpreting statutes we
begin with the literal words of the statute, which are the best guide to determining
legislative intent." (internal quotes, brackets and citation omitted)); Verska, 151
Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (plain language of a statute is the "intent of the
legislature"). The district court clearly relied on the plain language of the statute
to determine that AM-2201 is within the scope of Schedule I, and referenced
legislative history only as ultimately supporting the conclusion already reached
under the plain language analysis.

(Compare R., pp. 300-07 (plain language

analysis) with R., p. 307-08 (mentioning legislative statement of purpose and
committee minutes only after reaching conclusion based on analysis of the
language of statute).) Alley's argument is unsupported by the record.
Alley also argues that the district court should have "account[ed] for the
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and
extreme focus on structure." (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) However, it is the
plain language of the statute that controls, and that plain language brings
synthetic marijuana with "similar chemical structure" to THC (such as AM-2201)
within the prohibition of Schedule I, not just the chemical formulations
enumerated after the phrase "such as." (R., pp. 300-08.) Even if this Court were
to consider the proffer of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent it does not show
error.

Before the amendment a synthetic marijuana was within the scope of

Schedule I only if it had both "similar chemical structure and pharmacological
activity" of THC.

See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 111 (emphasis
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added). The amendment eliminated the element of "pharmacological activity."
Id. That the state had one less element to prove did not narrow the statute, as
apparently claimed by Alley; it in fact broadened it. The elimination of this portion
of the statute in no way informs the inquiry into whether AM-2201 is within the
scope of Schedule I.
Alley next argues that the district court should have accepted his expert's
testimony that AM-2201 "is in a different 'class"' than the compounds listed in
subsection (ii)(a). (Appellant's brief, pp. 16.) Alley has failed to show that this
testimony demonstrates any error by the district court.
Dr. McDougal testified about a "portion of the molecule," specifically, a
"five-carbon chain" located "off the nitrogen ring." (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 4-8.) Because
that chain ended with a "halogen fluorine atom" the chain was "an alkyl halide"
and not an "alkyl group," which is composed only of "carbon and hydrogen." (Tr.,
p. 39, Ls. 6-24.)

Once an atom such as the halogen fluorine is added the

compound is removed from the "alkyl group" and it "becomes a different class of
compound."

(Tr., p. 39, L. 23 - p. 41, L. 23.) The district court specifically

considered this testimony. (R., p. 303.) The court first rejected the testimony by
noting that the legislature did not use the phrase "alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" but
just "alky." (R., p. 304). Focusing on whether the carbon chain at issue was an
"alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" "ignor[es] the language chosen by the legislature."
(R., p. 304.)

The district court also rejected Dr. McDougal's testimony

distinguishing alkyl halides from alkyl groups because it related only to "a select
portion" of the statute "rather than reading it as a whole."
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(R., p. 305.)

Ultimately, because AM-2201 is a synthetic THC it fell within Schedule I. (R., pp.
305-08.)
Alley has failed to show error. Dr. McDougal did not testify that AM-2201
was in a different "class" than synthetic substances with similar chemical
structure as THC (the relevant part of the statute as determined by the district
court). He testified that a part of the atom, a carbon chain, was an "alkyl halide"
and not an "alkyl group" and assumed that the legislative use of the word "alkyl"
meant to include the latter and exclude the former. The district court properly
rejected the argument that this testimony demonstrated that AM-2201 fell outside
the proscription of synthetic THC in Schedule I.
Alley next argues that the examples of synthetic drugs in subsection (ii)(a)
contain only chains of carbon and hydrogen, and therefore any synthetic drug
with an atom other than carbon or hydrogen must be excluded as inconsistent
with the examples. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) The district court concluded
this argument "misses the point" because it, again, looks at only a very limited
part of the statute. (R., p. 305.) Alley's argument would essentially make the list
exclusive, when the plain language shows the opposite intent (R., pp. 305-08),
and even Alley acknowledges that the list is "non-exhaustive" (Appellant's brief,

p. 13).
Finally, Alley invokes the rule of lenity.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.)

"[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and
purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such
that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v.

11

Thomas,_ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and
citations

omitted).

The

mere "grammatical

possibility of a defendant's

interpretation does not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the interpretation
proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible reading of the [legislative]
purpose." Abbott v. United States,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010)
(internal quotations omitted). Alley has failed to show any ambiguity in the
statute, much less an ambiguity rising to the level of requiring application of the
rule of lenity.
The district court engaged in a thorough, thoughtful and correct analysis of
the plain language of the statute and concluded that AM-2201 was within the
scope of Schedule I. Even accepting the defense claim that AM-2201 is one
atom different than the representative chemical formulation in subsection (ii)(a),
such does not show that AM-2201 is not a "synthetic substance" with "similar
chemical structure" to THC "such as" the chemical formulations provided in the
statute.

The district court correctly concluded that the plain language of the

statute did not provide the chemical formulations as an exclusive list but instead
as representative of the types of chemical formulations of synthetic marijuana
prohibited. (R., pp. 300-08.) The plain language of the statute prohibited the
synthetic THC known as AM-2201.
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11.
Alley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The
Relevant Portion Of Schedule I ls Not Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To
Him

A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011) plainly

banned "synthetic cannabinoids," and therefore Alley's belief that AM-2201
(clearly a synthetic THC compound) did not fall under the specific chemical
examples provided in l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011) did not demonstrate lack
of notice that AM-2201 was a controlled substance.

(R., pp. 313-16.)

Alley

claims that the statute was sufficiently vague that he lacked notice that AM-2201
was a controlled substance, primarily because it is debatable whether AM-2201
falls within the specific chemical examples provided in l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a)
(2011 ). Alley has failed to show error because, whether or not the single fluorine
atom distinguished AM-2201 from the chemical formulae in subsection (ii)(a), it
was a banned synthetic THC, and the fact that it was synthetic THC was the very
reason that Alley possessed and sold it.

B.

Standard Of Review
The construction and application of a statute are questions of law over

which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641,
642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505,
80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)); State v. Scott, 135 Idaho 457, 458-59, 19
P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Pusey, 128 Idaho 647, 648, 917 P.2d
804, 805 (Ct. App. 1996). The constitutionality of a statute is likewise a question
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of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Doe I v. Doe, 138
Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 1040, 1050 (2003).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Statute Gave Notice That
All Synthetic THC, Not Just The Formulations In The Examples In The
Statute, Were Banned
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as

applied to a defendant's conduct. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness
challenge, a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to his conduct,
(1) fails to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed, or (2) fails to
provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003).

"It has long been held that a

statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation can
be given the statute." State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704
(2001).

"To succeed on an 'as applied' vagueness challenge, a complainant

must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's
specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that
police

had

unbridled

discretion

in

determining whether to

charge the

complainant." Williams v. State, 153 Idaho 380, 390, 283 P.3d 127, 137 (Ct.
App. 2012).
For the reasons stated above, and by the district court (R., pp. 300-08),
the plain language of the statute banned all synthetic THC with the language that
"synthetic equivalents" of THC and "synthetic substances ... with similar chemical
structure" were banned.

See l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011).

Alley argues that

because experts concluded that AM-2201 was not included in the example of
14

what types of synthetic substances were at issue (under the language "such as")
he lacked notice that AM-2201 was a controlled substance. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 21-22.) The district court properly rejected this argument as focused on only
a portion of the statute. Read in its entirety the language was plain that synthetic
THC was banned.
Alley next argues that a subsequent amendment "to clarify and correct for
the confusion created by the initial language in the statute" shows lack of notice.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.)

Even assuming that the later amendment did

clarify the statute, Alley has cited no law nor presented any logical reason why
this would be relevant to the question of what notice he in fact had.

Alley

certainly was not prospectively relying on the amendment.
Finally, Alley claims he "made a good faith effort to comply with Idaho
law." (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-24.) From the state's perspective Alley attempted
to exploit what he believed was a loophole to sell what he knew was synthetic
marijuana, but unfortunately for him he decided to consider only a small portion
of the relevant statute.

In addition, Alley's claim of "good faith" is seriously

undercut by the fact he was also selling two other forms of synthetic THC that he
acknowledges were controlled substances.

Even assuming the relevance of

"good faith," there is none in this case.
When the language of the entire statute dealing with synthetic THC is
considered it is plain that the legislature included all synthetic THC in Schedule I.
That AM-2201 is a formulation of synthetic THC that Alley believed was arguably

15

outside the scope of the "such as" example of synthetic THC in the statute did
not deprive Alley of reasonable notice that AM-2201 was a controlled substance.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of May, 2013, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
RYAN L. HOLDAWAY
Pitcher & Holdaway
40 W Cache Valley Blvd, Ste 3B
Logan, Utah 84341

KKJ/pm
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By NICOL TYLER
DEPIJTY

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4
5

STATE OF IDAHO,

6

Case No. CR-FE-11-0015480/
CR-FE-l l-0015482/CR-FE-11-0015483/
CR-FE-11-0016248

Plaintiff,

7

8

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER RE:

vs.
9

10
11

12

MORGAN C. ALLEY, TASHINA ALLEY,
AND CHARLYNDA GOGGIN, HIEU NGOC
PHAN,

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants.

13

14
15
16
17

18
19

This decision is entered to correct the caption to reflect the participation of Hieu Ngoc
Phan ("Phan") in the motion.

BACKGROUND
Defendant Morgan Alley has moved to dismiss the Indictment in this case. The motion
does not state the legal basis for requesting dismissal, but it is clear from the briefing and
arguments of counsel at the hearing that Defendant is alleging the Indictment does not state a

20

crime. He does not challenge the specificity of the Indictment or claim it does not put him on
21

notice of the crime charged. The factual basis for his motion is the claim that the substance AM22
23

f

I

2201 is not illegal. In the alternative, Defendant argues that the Idaho Uniform Controlled

24

Substances Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendants in this case because of

25

the asserted ambiguity regarding AM-2201. He is joined in the motion by co-defendants Tashina

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - PAGIDD0297

11

Alley, Goggin, and Phan, but those defendants did not actively participate by the filing of briefs
1
2

or examining witnesses at the hearing on this matter. This opinion will focus on the case against

3

Mr. Alley while recognizing that these are consolidated cases and the ruling will apply to the co-

4

defendants joining in the motion to the extent the charges against them are the same as those

5

against Mr. Alley. All Defendants have been charged with, among other things, conspiracy to

6

manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver, a Schedule I controlled substance in

7

violation of 37-2732(a), 18-1701, and 37-2732(f). The conspiracy count of the Indictment does
B

not further define the particular substance that was manufactured or possessed. Mr. Alley is also
9
10

charged with illegal possession of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of37-2732(c).

11

Ms. Goggin is charged with illegal delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of

12

37-2732(a). The illegal possession count against Mr. Alley simply specifies "marijuana and/or

13

synthetic cannabinols." The illegal delivery count against Ms. Alley says a Schedule I drug

14

without further specification. However, the record includes the State forensics laboratory report

15

of the controlled substance analysis. The report reflects the presence of 3 substances identified

16

by the Forensic Scientist as being Schedule I substances-AM-2201, JWM-019, and JWM-210.
17

The essential argument by Mr. Alley is that AM-2201 is not a Schedule I substance.
19
19

20
21
22

23

Specifically, It is conceded by Defendants that the other two substances are within the definition
of LC.§ 37-2705(d).
ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Is the substance identified as AM-2201 a controlled substance as defined in
Schedule I of the Idaho Uniform Controlled Substances Act?

24

2. Is I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii) unconstitutionally vague with respect to AM-2201,
25
26
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JWM-019, and JWM-210 as applied to the Defendants in this case?
1

2

3

DISCUSSION

I. Is AM-2201 a Controlled Substance?

Schedule I substances are defined in

4

Idaho Code §37-2705. Subsection (a) provides: "The controlled substances listed in this section

5

are included in schedule I." Subsections (b) and (c) list opiates and opium derivatives.

6

Subsection (d) lists hallucinogenic substances, including marijuana.

7

The substance AM-2201 is a synthetic compound invented by researchers at the

8

University of Connecticut. It is not named in the Controlled Substance Act. The name is derived
9

10
11

from the initials of the inventor and conveys nothing about the nature of the substance itself. The
state maintains AM-2201 is described by LC. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). That section provides:

. 12
13

14
15

(d) Hallucinogenic substances. Any material, compound, mixture or preparation
which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, their
salts, isomers and salts of isomers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the
existence of these salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the
specific chemical designation (for purposes of this paragraph only, the term
"isomer" includes the optical, position and geometric isomers):

16

17
18
19

(30) Tetrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained
in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic
substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as
the following:

20

ii. The following synthetic drugs:
21

22
23

24
25

26

a. Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl) indole or IHindol-3- yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole
ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4morpholinyl)ethyl, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any
extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent.
Rather than name a specific substance, §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) describes groups of similar, but
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not chemically identical, substances. The parties pose the question then, as whether AM-2201
1
2

3
4

falls within the compounds described by §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). As discussed below, the proper
inquiry is the legislative intent in amending the statue.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. The words

5

must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be construed as a

6

whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but simply follows the law

7

as written. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted).
8

"We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and
9

10

other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed

11

intent of the legislature." Verska v. St. A/phonsus Reg'/ Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d

12

502, 506 (2011) (citing City ofSun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851P.2d961,

13

963 (1993). A court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable

14

statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature. It is incumbent upon the court to give

15

the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its potency. Hillside Landscape Const.,

16

Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749, 264 P.3d 388 (2011). In determining the ordinary
17
18
19
20
21

22

meaning of a statute effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. Id. (quoting State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138
P.3d 308, 309 (2006)).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress there was no dispute that the applicable statute
describes compounds with a common parent structure a portion of which is composed of an

23

24
25

26
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indole ring. 1 This is represented in State's Exhibit 101:
1

2
3
4
5
6
Ntphthoyllndole (ldoho Code 37-270S(d)30.K.•l

7

8

The indole is the portion of the compound represented below:

h-ll

9

~N).

10
11

12
13

N represents a nitrogen atom. R 1 in the first diagram represents a chain of atoms attached to the
nitrogen atom. This chain of atoms is called a substituent. Specifically, the substituent here is a

14

chain containing carbon and hydrogen atoms. This much is agreed upon. The controversy is

15

over whether the chain attached to the nitrogen atom can contain an element other than carbon

16

and hydrogen and still fit within the definition of the statute.

17

AM-2201 is represented structurally as:

18
19
20

21
22
23

24
1

25

26

What follows here is the Court's best effort to interpret submissions of the parties, including the testimony. This
judge is not an organic chemist and the discussion may not be completely accurate so far as the chemistry is
concerned, but the Court concludes this ultimately is not controlling.
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1

2

3
4
5
6

For the non-chemist, these representations are somewhat problematical in that some
7

information contained in the diagrams is implied rather than explicit. For example, in organic
8
9

chemistry, when illustrating the structural formula for hydrocarbons, each unlabeled vertex2 and

10

unattached endpoint represents a carbon atom. Carbon has 4 valence bonds. Absent notation

11

otherwise, it is assumed a hydrogen atom is present wherever a bond is available. 3 A double line

12

represents a double bond between adjacent atoms.

13

The portion of the AM-2201 diagram from the N to the Fis the heart of the dispute here

14

and the focus of the evidence and arguments at the hearing on the motion. In particular the
15

parties dispute the meaning of"by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl ... "
16
17

Some basic terminology is necessary to understand the arguments made. Both sides refer to the

18
19
20
2

21

22

Used in the mathematical sense of"the point where two sides ofa plane figure or an angle intersect."
For example, the written formula for butane is C4H10. The structural formula is shown below along with the
skeletal structural formula generally used by chemists and as represented in the exhibits in this case. All three
represent the same compound.
3

H H H H
23

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

H-C-C-C-C-H
24
25
26

H H H H
Butane is also known as n-Butane, Diethyl, Butyl hydride, and Methylethylmethane. Source: National Center for
Biotechnology Information website accessed at htt,P://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/summruy/swnmary.cgi?cid=7843>
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IUPAC 4 nomenclature to explain the statute in question. A hydrocarbon is a compound
1

2

composed only of carbon and hydrogen atoms. Alkanes are acyclic (chain structure)

3

hydrocarbons having the general formula CnH2n+2, and therefore consisting entirely of hydrogen

4

atoms and saturated carbon atoms. Alkyl groups are univalent groups derived from alkanes by

5

removal of a hydrogen atom from any carbon atom: CnH2n+1-. The groups derived by removal of

6

a hydrogen atom from a terminal carbon atom of unbranched alkanes form a subclass of normal

7

alkyl (n-alkyl) group~. Alkyl radicals are carbon-centered radicals derived formally by removal

8

of one hydrogen atom from an alkane. The court could not locate, and the parties did not cite, a
9

10

stand-alone definition of alkyl.
Defendant's witnesses testified that AM-2201 is not within the scope of the statute. Dr.

11
12

McDougal based his conclusion on the structure of the substituent being an alkyl halide rather

13

than an alkyl group. That is, the presence of the fluoride atom at the terminus of the carbon chain

14

prevents the compound being characterized as an alkyl group. He contrasts this with the

15

structure of JWH-018 that has a simple 5 carbon chain attached at the nitrogen atom on the

16

indole ring. Dr. De Jesus essentially says the same thing, only he labels the substituent a fluro17

substituted alkyl group. By contrast, Mr. Sincerbeaux testified that it is the removal of the
18
19

20

hydrogen atom from the alkane that renders the resulting compound an alkyl group. In his view,
it matters not what replaces the missing hydrogen atom. 5 The contrasting views can be

21
22
4

23

24
25
26

International Union Of Pure And Applied Chemistry; A Guide to !UPAC Nomenclature of Organic Compounds
(Recommendations 1993), 1993, Blackwell Scientific publications. Accessed commencing at
http://www.chem.qmul.ac.uk/iupac/class/ and /UPAC Nomenclature of Organic Chemistry. Accessed commencing
at http://www.iupac.org/fileadmin/the-network/index.html.
5
Mr. Sincerbeaux also testifies extensively concerning his involvement in the drafting of the statute and what he and
the others sponsoring the legislation intended. Mr. Sincerbeaux and his colleagues are not legislators. Nor is it
apparent from the legislative history that the lawmakers adopted the sponsor's reasoning along with the proposed

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - PAG~0'0303

II

illustrated as follows:
1

N-(CHi-C H2-C H2-C H2-C H2F) represents the interpretation of the

2

statute by the professors. N-(CH2-C H2-C H2-C H2)-CH2F represents
the view espoused by the state's forensic scientist. In other words, the state treats
the carbon chain with the first 4 carbons as the spine and the final compound
(CH2F) as a substituent.

3
4

5

As stated by Dr. De Jesus, the Idaho legislature is not a body of chemists. The issue is
6
7

what did the legislature intend to add to Schedule I? The legislature did not use the term "alkyl

8

group" or "alkyl radical." It used the phrase "any compound structurally derived from [certain

9

named chemicals] by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl. .. " The

10

legislature was not engaged in naming the resulting chemical compound, which is the point of

11

much of the testimony regarding the IUP AC rules for nomenclature. If naming the resulting

12

chemical compound was the purpose of the legislature, it is obvious that neither AM-2201 nor

13

JWH-018 would be derived as names. Those are the names of the compounds discussed by
14

Defendants' experts, both of whom opine that JWH-018 comes within the prohibition of the
15
16

statute.

17

The parties, by focusing on the correct name for the portion of the compound represented

18

by the chain attached at the nitrogen atom are ignoring the language chosen by the legislature. It

19

appears undisputed from the testimony that the AM-2201 is derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole

20

21

and that derivation happens by substitution at the nitrogen atom by alkyl halide. In organic
chemistry, substitution refers to a reaction process. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a

22

substitution reaction is "any of a class of chemical reactions in which an atom, ion, or group of
23
24

25

26

language in the bill that ultimately became J.C. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). Consequently, this is not part of the
legislative history and sheds little light on the intent of the legislature.
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atoms or ions in a molecule is replaced by another atom, ion, or group. 6 Wikipedia says "in a
1

2

substitution reaction, a functional group in a particular chemical compound is replaced by

3

another group. 7 Depending on which definition is chosen, the words "by substitution ... by

4

alkyl" could restrict the meaning of the phrase to mean that the prohibited substance may only be

5

derived using an alkyl functional group, or it may mean that "a group of atoms or ions"

6

containing only hydrocarbons with a missing hydrogen atom is part of the process by which the

7

substance is created. This type of analysis misses the point.
8

The Defendants and their experts derive their interpretation of the statute by reading a
9

10

select portion rather than reading it as a whole. To properly glean the meaning of the statute, one

11

has to read the statute as a whole, commencing with the listing of compounds that are defined in

12

Schedule I. In this instance the beginning point is LC. §37-2705(a). This informs the reader that

13

Schedule I drugs are those listed in "this section"-meaning the entirety of §37-2705. There

14

follows 5 subsections listing various types of substances. Subsection (b) deals with opiates;

15

subsection (c) deals with opium derivatives; subsection (d) deals with hallucinogenic substances;

16
17

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25
26

6

Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "substitution reaction," accessed April 03, 2012,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/571075/substitution-reaction
See, also, Illustrated Glossary of Organic Chemistry, which defines substitution reaction as "a reaction in which any
part of a molecule is replaced (substituted). Harding, Illustrated Glossary of Organic Chemistry, UCLA <
http:!lwww.chem.uc/a.edu/harding/IGOCIS!substitution reaction.html>; accessed April 03, 2012.
7
httP://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substitution reaction; accessed April 03, 2012. To the amazement of the Court, the
defendants' scientific experts both cite Wikipedia in their written submissions. Wikipedia may be a common source
of information, but given its editorial policies, the Court hardly views it as an authoritative source. While any given
article may be completely accurate, it is not possible for one not familiar with the topic of the article to tell the
accurate from the false. From Wikipedia itself:
Wikipedia is written collaboratively by largely anonymous Internet volunteers who write without
pay. Anyone with Internet access can write and make changes to Wikipedia articles (except in
certain cases where editing is restricted to prevent disruption or vandalism). Users can contribute
anonymously, under a pseudonym, or with their real identity, if they choose.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About >accessed April 03, 2012 (emphasis added).
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subsection (e) deals with central nervous system depressants; and subsection (f) deals with
1

2
3

4
5
6

stimulants. We are concerned here with subsection (d):
(d) Hallucinogenic substances. Any material, compound, mixture or preparation
which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances [their
salts, isomers, etc.]:
Subsection (d) has 35 sub-subsections. The first 29 are substances from 4-bromo-2,5dimethoxy amphetamine to marijuana, to peyote, to psilocin. The last 5 also list specific

7

substances. Sub-subsection (30) does not list a specific substance, but a description of types of
B

substances:
9

10

11

(30) Tetrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained

in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic
substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as
the following:

12
13

Sub-subsection (30) has two sub-sub-subsections. Sub-sub-subsection (i) is titled

14

"Tetrahydrocannabinols" and has a lettered list of 4 specific substances. We are concerned with

15

Sub-sub-subsection (ii). It is titled "The following synthetic drugs:" and contains lettered sub-

16

sub-sub-sections (a) through (i).
17
18
19

By stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is fairly easy to
discern the intention of the legislature:

20

37-2705. Schedule I.
(a) The controlled substances listed in this section are included in schedule I.

21

(d) Hallucinogenic substances.
(30) synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in
the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives,
and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as ...
ii. The following synthetic drugs:
[list].

22
23

24

25
26
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"Cannabis, sp". is marijuana. The psychoactive substance in marijuana is Tetrahydrocannabinol
1

or THC. " ... and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical

2
3

structure" is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic the

4

hallucinogenic properties of marijuana. Use of the words "such as" by the legislature means the

5

list is not exclusive. It could as well read "for example." Whether the Defendants are correct

6

that AM-2201 is not derived "by substitution ... by alkyl," or the state is correct in its view to the

7

contrary, it is clear the legislature intended to include it and substances like it in Schedule I. The

8

legislative statement of purpose provides:
9

The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the public
concerning tetrahydrocannabinols from synthetic drugs (Spice) that mimic the
effects of Cannabis and identifying additional substances to be classified in
schedule I. 8

10
11

12

The chemical structure of AM-2201, if not exactly described in I.C. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a), is
13
14

certainly similar. The difference amounts to the presence of a fluoride atom rather than a

15

hydrogen atom at the end of the carbon chain attached to the nitrogen atom on the indole. Dr.

16

McDougal makes this point with his diagrams on his letter dated 6 January 2012 [sic]. 9 Dr. De

17

Jesus makes the point with his discussion alternative language that could have been used by the

18

legislature. He suggests that it should have simply left out the words "by alkyl, alkenyl,

19

cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." While this indeed would have

20
21
22
23
24

25

8

9

26

Affidavit of Heather Reilly, Exhibit 1.
Defendant's Exhibit 2.
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made the language broader, including it does not make the language of the entire statute
1

2

narrower. It simply makes narrower the list of examples given by the legislature of the type of

3

substances being added to the list. The minutes of the legislative committees also make clear

4

that the purpose behind the legislation is the banning of categories of substances, not just

5

particular compounds.

6
7

The Court finds that the Idaho legislature unambiguously intended to add synthetic
imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and it did so in broad language that encompasses AM-2201.

8

The contrary conclusion is reached only by ignoring the portion of the statute which indicates the
9
10

specific formulations are given by way of example. It was the intent of the legislature to not deal

11

with the so-called "spice" problem by constantly amending the statute as new analogs for THC

12

are developed or discovered in the scientific literature by purveyors of mind altering substances.

13

2. Is J.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii) unconstitutionallv vague?
(a) Legal standards.

14
15
16

A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute "bears the burden of establishing that
the statute is unconstitutional and 'must overcome a strong presumption of validity."' State v.

17

Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003) (citing Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117
18

Idaho 706, 709, 791P.2d1285, 1288 (1990). Under both the U.S. Constitution and Idaho
19
20

Constitution, "[a] criminal statUte must be sufficiently certain to show what the legislature

21

22

3-( 1-naphlhoyl)lndole

23

24

-,

~

,,

25

h!ttl~e: I•

l~8
JWH-018

AM-2201
Alkyl

3·11-naphthoyl)lndolB

.

yl group: la spetj{l41Q
not •pecified

•glatatlon

In leg!11;lal1on

F

26
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intended to prohibit and punish; otherwise it is void for uncertainty." City ofLewiston v.
1
2

Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 350, 303 P.2d 680, 682 (1956). "The void-for-vagueness doctrine is

3

premised upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."

4

State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-12, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003) (holding that provision in

5

Idaho's trespass statute was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness under applied vagueness

6

analysis). It "requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity

7

and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the
8

statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id.
9

10

(citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)). "It

11

is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness ifits prohibitions are

12

not clearly defined." Id. (citing Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). Due process

13

also provides that "no one may be required at the peril ofloss of liberty to speculate as to the

14

meaning of penal statutes." Id. (citations omitted).

15

As such, the Idaho Supreme Court "has held that due process requires that all 'be

16

informed as to what the State commands or forbids' and that 'men of common intelligence' not
17

be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132
18

19

(citing State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998), Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574

20

(1974)). "A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of

21

ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... or if it fails to establish minimal

22

guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." Id. (citations

23

omitted). "A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a

24

defendant's conduct." Id.
25

26
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In a facial challenge of vagueness, ''the complainant must demonstrate that the law is
1

2

impermissibly vague in all of its applications," such that there are no circumstances where it is

3

constitutional. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132 (citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at

4

497) (reiterating that "the challenger must show that the enactment is invalid in toto"). In an

5

applied challenge, "a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the defendant's

6

conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to

7

provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether
8

to arrest him." Id. A facial challenge and applied challenge are mutually exclusive. Id.
9

(b) Arguments of the parties

10

The Defendants do not expressly mount a facially unconstitutional challenge, but use

11

12

langue in their arguments that could be construed as suggesting the statute is unconstitutional on

13

its face. 10

14

15

Defendants argue that LC. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague because a
person of common intelligence cannot determine what conduct is being prohibited and

16

ambiguities exist that open the door to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the act.
17

Defendant asserts that J.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) must necessarily be of a highly technical nature and
18
19

therefore very specific as to its meaning and application. Idaho House Bill 139 instead created

20

confusion and uncertainty as to the meaning of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) according to Defendants.

21

This is demonstrated by the disagreement between the parties' experts as to whether AM-2201 is

22

covered by the statute within subsection§ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii). As such, a person of common

23
24
10

25
26

The Defendants' brief is somewhat short on law and long on argument. The Defendants do not make explicit
whether the challenge is based on the language of the statute alone or as applied. The cases cited by Defendants do
not make the distinction.
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experience could not be expected to know of the statute's application to AM-2201. Defendant
1

2
3

points out that most people in the U.S. population could not know whether they were possessing
a chemical potentially covered by 2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) without first seeking professional input.
Defendants note that Dr. Parent's services were obtained in order to remain compliant

4

5
6

with the law. They claim was only because Dr. Parent concluded that AM-2201 was not covered
that the manufacturers and retailers switched to the chemical. Defendant also point out that Utah

7

passed its own law in which the legislature named numerous chemicals that were banned, but
8

that Idaho instead decided to describe the chemicals. Thus, Defendants argue that, because is
9

10
11

only one chemical by the name AM-2201, the legislature should have simply named AM-2201 as
an illegal substance rather than describe potential chemical structures.
Ultimately, Defendants suggest that the only way for the State to constitutionally regulate

12
13

drugs is through legislation specifically naming individual chemicals. Defendants recognize that

14

the state never likely be able to make the list long enough to capture all of the potential chemicals

15

that can be abused. 11

Defendants theorize it is not possible use a description other than

16

substance by substance to ban chemicals without the statute suffering from unconstitutional
17

vagueness and over-breadth.
18

The State sets forth that the statute provides actual notice and enforcement guidelines

19

20

sufficient to satisfy due process standards. The State argues that the statute sufficiently informs a

21

person of common intelligence that AM-2201 and similar types of synthetic drugs are illegal.

22

The State also asserts that Defendants understood the legislation based on their attempt to

23

circumvent the law by relying on a chemist to recommend a substitute substance and the

24
25

26

11

In fact it appears Defendants are counting on this to stay in business in the future.
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maintaining of a clandestine operation. The State characterizes Defendant's production of AM1

2
3
4

2201 as a calculated risk based on the erroneous belief that the legislature could not ban AM2201 without specifically naming it.
The State disagrees with the argument that the statute is vague because of its technical

5

nature. This would yield absurd results by invalidating all statutes requiring specialized

6

legislation or using specialized terminology where a defendant can locate an expert to disagree.

7

The State also notes that scientific or technical terms of art in a regulated field do not

8

automatically render a statute unconstitutional. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348
9
10

(1918). The State points out that the Defendant concedes that the description in I.C. § 37-

11

2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) "intentionally covers thousands of potential chemicals," and the State asserts

12

that Defendant and his counsel were well aware of the highly publicized rise of synthetic drug

13

use in Idaho such as "spice."

14

15

The State also notes that Defendant Alley's s counsel participated extensively in
committee hearings in opposition to enactment of the law by attempting to dissuade lawmakers

16

from prohibiting designer drugs, including cannabinoids. The Court does not find this argument
17

18
19
20

on point. While counsel may have been representing Mr. Alley at the time of counsel's
appearance before the legislature, there is no evidence to that effect in the record.
In an abundance of caution, given the Defendants' overall lack of specificity of the nature

21

of the challenge being mounted, the State, in its brief, discussed enforcement guidelines as they

22

pertain to vagueness challenges to a statute. Defendants did not brief the issue. At the hearing

23

Defendants stated the issue was not briefed because Defendants were lacking evidence to support

24

the challenge on an "as applied basis." At the hearing, Defendants sought to interject the issue
25
26
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into the case through recently obtained preliminary hearing transcripts. The Court declined to
1
2

allow this evidence which apparently concerned events involving pending criminal cases in

3

eastern Idaho. The exclusion was discretionary and based on the late disclosure to the State. The

4

Court will not discuss it further.

5

6

(c) Discussion
To the extent the Defendants are making an argument that the statute is facially overbroad

7

(see footnote No. 10, above), the argument must fail.

The answer is in the testimony of

8

Defendant's experts. The essence of a facial challenge is that the complainant must demonstrate
9

10
11

that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications, such that there are no circumstances
where it is constitutional. Here all three of Defendant's experts agree that JWH-210 and JWH-

12

019 are unambiguously described by the statute. This is obviously a circumstance where the

13

State has banned a substance and there is no confusion over whether it is banned. Defendants do

14

not claim they were confused over the legality of these substances.

15

Ultimately, the Defendants' arguments are all based on the same faulty premise-that §

16

37-2705(d)(30)(ii) is a stand-alone statute. That sub-sub-subsection of the statue is part of a
17

larger statute as discussed above. That discussion will not be repeated here. In drawing the
18
19

conclusion that AM-2201 is a legal substance, Defendant's experts focused on whether the

20

particular substance was described by the isolated subsection rather than on the proper question

21

of whether the substance is "synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in

22

the. resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their

23

isomers with similar chemical structure ... "

In lay terms, is this substance a synthetic

24

cannabinoid?
25
26
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The following is taken from a website cited by Dr. McDougal in Exhibit 2:
1

AM-2201 -A Hyperpotent Halogenated Unintended Consequence

2

With the recent legal issues surrounding certain synthetic cannabinoids in the
United States, the market has changed

3
4

The effects of AM-2201 also appear to differ from natural cannabis and the first
generation synthetic cannabinoids, both to start and as tolerance builds. Initially
the effects are quite similar, although doses for AM-2201 are approximately a
third of JWH-018. This has resulted in many reports of self-reported "seasoned"
synthetic cannabinoid users having anxiety reactions as a result of apparent
overdose due to increased sensitivity to inaccurate measurement. Tolerance builds
quickly, and frequent users have reported psychedelic-style effects typically
previously only associated with high-dose oral consumption of marijuana.
<http://countyourculture.com/2011/0l/12/am-2201-a-hyperpotent-halogenatedunintended-consequence/ >last accessed April 5, 2012.

5
6
7

8

9
10
11

There is a link to comments on the same page that contain a series of commentary on AM-2201

12

that can only lead to the conclusion the posters are discussing a marijuana substitute. 12

13

Wikipedia, the seeming source of information of choice by the general population, contains the

14

following under the entry discussing Cannabinoid:

15

Synthetic cannabinoids encompass a variety of distinct chemical classes: the
classical cannabinoids structurally related to THC, the nonclassical cannabinoids
(cannabimimetics) including the aminoalkylindoles, 1,5-diarylpyrazoles,
quinolines, and arylsulphonamides, as well as eicosanoids related to the
endocannabinoids.

16
17
18

19
12

20
21
22
23

24
25
26

A sample:

DailyToker
December 3rd, 2011

REPLy

I QUOTE

Well I make and sell herbal incense, AM-2201 is the active ingredient in my company's product.
I add lg of AM to 30g of Marshmallow leaf, and it last me about 10 days or so.
I have been using AM220 l for over a year now and have not noticed any ill effects .. .its just like smoking weed to
me.
I guess everyone reacts differently.
<htt.p://cou.gtyourculture. com/20 l l/01/J2/am-2201-a-hyperpotent-halogenated-unintended-conseguence/#comroents
>last accessed April 5, 2012
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Other notable synthetic cannabinoids include:
1

2

AM-2201, a potent cannabinoid receptor agonist.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic cannabinoid#Synthetic and patented ca
nnabinoids > last accessed April 5, 2012.

3
4

5

If this weren't enough, one has only to look at the name AM-2201. The name was given to the

6

chemical by its inventor. Mr. Alley is apparently engaged in the business of marketing synthetic

7

cannabinoids. 13 Assuming, based on his counsel's argument, that someone such as Mr. Alley

8

went looking for information to determine the nature of AM-2201, it does not great effort or
9

10

ingenuity to get from the Wikipedia entry on AM-2201 to the patent. 14 Footnote No. 1 in the

11

Wikipedia article is a link to the patent. The patent makes clear that AM-2201 intended to

12

mimic marijuana. It was specifically invented in the hope of discovering a compound that could

13

be used in medical research in place of marijuana. See Exhibits 111 and 112.

14
15

There is no real ambiguity or uncertainty over the nature of AM-2201. Nor is the statute
vague or incapable of being understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. The Defendants are

16

of the mistaken impression that it is somehow improper for the legislature to outlaw "thousands
17

of compounds." Defendant's claimed ambiguity only exists because Defendant's asked their
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

13

Mr. Alley did not testify and not submit any affidavit in support of the motion. His counsel argued that Mr. Alley
and the other Defendants were assiduously attempting to follow the law and were attempting to find a legal substance
to market in light of the actions of the Board of Pharmacy and the legislature. He suggested by argument that Mr.
Alley is merely a businessman doing his best to make his way in the world , but there is no evidence in the record
that any Defendant, including Mr. Alley, took any particular action. Dr. Parent's letter was addressed to Counsel and
there is no evidence that any Defendant relied on Dr. Parent's opinion in any way.
14
Cj. Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501, 102S.Ct.1186 (1982)
holding that the technical tenn "roach clip" has sufficiently clear meaning in the drug paraphernalia industry such
that, without undue burden, the defendant could easily determine the meaning of the term, citing dictionaries
defining "roach."

25

26
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experts the wrong question. Rather than ask whether AM-2201 is described in LC. §371

2

3

2705(d)(30)(ii)(a), they should have asked the experts whether AM-2201 is a synthetic
cannabinoid. If they had asked that question, the answer would no doubt have been "yes."

4

5

CONCLUSION

6

AM-2201 is a schedule one substance. This is so whether or not it is specifically

7

described in LC. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). It is on Schedule I because it is a "synthetic equivalent

8

of the substances contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or
9

synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure."
10

11

Idaho Code §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) is not unconstitutionally vague nor are the 2011

12

amendments to Idaho Code §37-2705 applicable here. The Idaho Legislature intended to outlaw

13

synthetic marijuana and it did so in terms such that a person of ordinary intelligence is on notice

14

of the conduct prohibited.

15

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

16

IT IS SO ORDERED.
17

Dated this 9th day of April, 2012, nunc J!.ro tune this 6th da:>,;
18

19
20

eenwood
istrict Judge

21
22
23

24

25
26
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